Jason Hommel

12641 Anvil Road

Grass Valley, CA 95945

(530) 274-3450

DATED: _____________________________

1. Jury Trial is demanded under the provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title I, Sec 102, (C), (1): (C) "Jury Trial. - If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this section - " (1) "any party may demand a trial by jury."

1. Jurisdiction is shown by the "Right to Sue" letter (see Exhibit A) which I received from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, (EEOC), which says my lawsuit must be filed in U.S. District Court, or federal court. Jurisdiction founded on the existence of a question arising under particular statutes. This action arises under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and 26 USC Sec. 6724 and Treasury Regulation 301.6109-1(c) or 26 CFR 301.6109-1(c). Jurisdiction is founded specifically under Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, under the title, ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS, SEC. 2000e-5. [Section 706], (3) "Each United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter."

2. Defendant's location of business is within the State of California; Squaw Valley Ski Corporation is located at Squaw Valley Ski Resort. Address: P.O. Box 2007, Olympic Valley, CA 96146

1. Plaintiff is seeking justice in the form of punitive damages, wages for days worked and not paid, wages for winter season of 2001-2002, compensation for litigation expenses, and compensation for stress, inconvenience and aggravation, and for injunctive relief to be able to work for Squaw Valley in the future. The basis for my claim is under Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which provides for punitive damages for willfulness. The defendants willfully, purposefully and illegally engaged in discriminatory employment practices wherein they refused to follow the procedures described in law for when an employer does not obtain a Social Security Number (SSN) from an employee. Instead of following the laws as described in 26 USC Sec. 6724, and Treasury Regulation 301.6109-1(c), or 26 CFR 301.6109-1(c), which I informed them about, and instead of submitting an affidavit as described in those laws, an affidavit which should have simply said that they were unable to obtain a Social Security Number (SSN) from me, and instead of making reasonable accommodation for my religious beliefs as is required under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the defendants willfully, deliberately, and purposefully chose another action when they decided to terminate my employment and/or deny me employment, in violation of Title VII, because I refused to provide them with a SSN, the use of which I find incompatible with my religious beliefs as a Christian.

1. On December 16, 2001, I began a daily journal (see Exhibit B) to record the events as they were happening. From that journal, I am able to give a summary of the events that took place.

2. On Monday, December 10, 2001, I was interviewed for a position as part time ski coach for the masters program for Squaw Valley Ski Corporation (SVSC). The masters program is a group of older skiers aged 30 and over who want better instruction, many of them participating in racing.

3. On Wednesday, December 12, 2001, after a day of skiing to demonstrate my ability, I was hired by Chris Rawson and Sid Crocket in the Race Department as a Masters Alpine Ski Coach for the Masters Ski Program, working for SVSC. (In college, I was ranked about 50^th in the nation in slalom, so my skiing ability, race history, and qualifications were outstanding.) Sid Crocket gave me a new-hire form which said my pay was $8.50/hour to take to the Human Resources Department, from which I received a new employee packet which contained an I-9 form, a W-4 form, and a "wellness exam" form which all needed to be submitted at the same time. My first day of work was on Friday, December 14, 2001. I passed the "wellness exam" that afternoon, which was a physical exam needed to process the new-hire paperwork. Friday was the soonest the doctor's office would schedule the wellness exam. I worked on Saturday, December 15, and brought in the results of my wellness exam, and my new-hire paperwork. I was told by Chris Rawson to submit the paperwork that evening, which I did.

4. I worked Sunday morning, December 16, 2001, for half a day when I was told by Gary Pederson, Head of Ski Services, that there was a problem with my paperwork since it did not contain a SSN. I was told by Gary Pederson, to get the paperwork problem with Human Resources solved as soon as possible. In the first few days that I worked, I verbally informed all three coaches, who were Chris Rawson, Sid Crocket, and Gary Pederson that I did not use a SSN due to my religious beliefs as a Christian. Within a few days later, I informed them all of my religious beliefs also in writing sent by certified mail, return receipt requested.

5. To prove to the court that I have a sincerely held bona fide religious belief as a Christian, I submit that my web site www.linkjesus.com is ample and overwhelming evidence. My web site consists of over 50 essays that I have written on the subject of Bible prophecy, proving that the pre-tribulation rapture view is the Biblically correct view, including topics such as the mark of the beast.

6. Ultimately, the decision to "not hire me" after I was already hired, in contrast to the wishes of the three coaches who all wanted me to work, was made by three other people at SVSC: Jim Brady, Head of Human Resources; Ron Welton, Controller; and Hans A. Burkhart, General Manager.

1. On Monday, December 17, 2001, I spoke at length with Jim Brady, Head of Human Resources, about the problem with my new-hire paperwork and the fact that it did not contain a SSN. In a demonstration of his knowledge of Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, Jim Brady said that SVSC would have to look into whether providing reasonable accommodations for my religious beliefs under Title VII would constitute an "undue burden". Jim Brady said he would need to do two things that might be an "undue burden" to SVSC's business.

A. Hand-write checks for my wages,

B. Create and assign me a unique identifying number on the SVSC employee season pass ID card, such as 000-00-0001.

2. Additionally, of course, SVSC would need to file an affidavit or statement to the appropriate government agencies that they followed their legal requirement to ask me for a SSN, and state that they were unable to obtain a SSN from me because of my religious beliefs. But Jim Brady did not mention that this might be an "undue burden;" rather, he claimed that looking at and following the laws that demand such action would be an "undue burden."

3. None of these things present an unreasonable burden for SVSC’s business, and certainly not an "undue burden". Jim Brady verbally gave me several more arguments as to why he would not hire me.

A. In contrast to the instructions on the I-9 form, he alleged that my Colorado Driver's License was not acceptable for the I-9 form.

B. He said that he thought it was an "undue burden" to have to actually read the laws that I was trying to tell him about, such as 26 USC Sec. 6724 and Treasury Regulation 301.6109-1(c), which basically state that no penalty can be assessed to an employer for not obtaining a SSN from an employee if it "if it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect."

C. He said he had no interest in reading, or looking at, any laws I might want to tell him about, since he claimed that laws can be interpreted any number of ways.

D. He also said that he had no way of knowing whether the laws I was telling him about, were, in fact, laws. I said that I already provided him with the code and section numbers, which he could then look up himself to determine if what I was saying was the law.

E. He also said that it was an "undue burden" on his business to have to look up the laws I was telling him about, to check for himself whether the laws I was citing were, in fact, "real" laws.

F. Finally, Jim Brady admitted that he already spoke with his boss, Ron Welton, about hiring me. Jim Brady said that his boss would not let him hire me without a SSN, and that since he wanted to keep his job, he just had to follow orders, since he liked his job and wanted to keep it.

4. I argue that all of Jim Brady's claims and arguments are evidence and expressions of his knowing and willful violation of the law, and also, his complete and reckless disregard and total contempt for the laws of the United States, and thus, are a part of the basis for my demand for a jury trial and claim for punitive damages in the event of willfulness under the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

5. The next day, Tuesday December 18, 2001, I spoke to Ron Welton on the phone, and he gave me the following reasons why SVSC would not hire me:

A. That SVSC hired over 100,000 people in the past 10 years, and that they all had SSNs. (This does not prove that the policy of SVSC is lawful, it only proves that it is pervasive, and also, probably intentional.)

B. Next, he said that he was required by law to obtain my SSN, but upon being questioned as to which law, he was unable to cite any law.

C. Next, I mentioned that I don't use a SSN due to my religious beliefs, and that discrimination against me is a Title VII violation of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, and Ron challenged whether not hiring me was religious discrimination.

1. On Tuesday, December 18, 2001, I wrote and sent my first letter (see Exhibit C) by certified mail to SVSC to all six people at SVSC who were primarily concerned about the matter of my employment. In that letter (see Exhibit C), I explained that what SVSC is doing is a criminal violation and a felony, and I quoted the appropriate laws. I also mentioned that the EEOC has held that what they are doing is a Title VII violation of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, and I quoted the appropriate legal references and opinions. I also mentioned again the laws that clearly say that there can be NO PENALTY to the employer for not obtaining a SSN from an employee, therefore, there is no legal requirement that causes an "undue burden" on them that prevents them from making "reasonable accommodation" for my religious beliefs as is required under Title VII . These laws indicate that there is no penalty, as long as SVSC shows that they followed the law that requires them TO ASK for a SSN.

1. Jim Brady already was well aware of these laws before he met me. On Saturday, December 15, 2001, the day I initially gave my paperwork to SVSC, Jim Brady said that "without a SSN, there would be a $50 fine from the IRS if they reported my earnings under a false number." Of course, I never asked him to lie and report a false number. I asked him to follow the instructions in the law that mentions both the $50 penalty, and how to avoid it in those cases when an employer is unable to obtain a SSN from an employee. This demonstrates that Mr. Brady was well aware of the law as cited below, 301.6109-1(c). That SVSC was aware of these laws shows their willfulness in their refusal to hire me, and their willfulness in their refusal to follow the procedure as described in these laws. The laws are the following:. [words in brackets added by me to show context]

Since Jim Brady at SVSC was aware of the law regarding the possibility of the $50 penalty, and since that law shows how to easily avoid such a penalty even if an employee fails to provide a SSN to the employer, SVSC was certainly even more aware of the laws after I sent SVSC detailed information about the laws in three certified letters (see Exhibits C, D, and E).

1. In a timely response to my first letter, Ron Welton both called me and wrote to me (see Exhibit F) saying that the he would not hire me because the California Employment Development Department (EDD) requires a SSN. I recognized that such a requirement, if true, would prevent SVSC from making "reasonable accommodation" under Title VII, because I cannot reasonably ask an employer to violate the law. Therefore, I researched the EDD rules, thinking that I might have to sue the EDD, and challenge any such hypothetical law under the United States Constitution, instead of suing SVSC. But there is no such absolute requirement by the EDD, and thus, no need for me to sue the EDD or challenge any such non-existent law.

2. After I spoke with Ron Welton, I researched the EDD on the internet, and I called the EDD repeatedly to find a person with some level of competence, and within a few hours I spoke with an EDD representative who admitted there would be "no penalty to an employer who employed a person without a SSN, as long as the employer made a statement saying that they attempted to get a SSN from their employee." Failure to get a number would not result in a penalty, as long as the employer showed "intent" to get one from their employee. I didn't get the name of this nice woman, but she transferred me to an auditor who confirmed the same thing, that "that there is NOT an absolute requirement for a SSN". I didn't get the name of this person either, but she said she would get a supervisor to research the law and get back to me on my rather specific questions.

3. The person who called me back from the EDD was Tony Sunseri, at (916) 464-2500, who was now the third person at the EDD who said that I was right. Basically, Mr. Sunseri and I agreed that if the employer was refusing me employment, denying me employment based on what the EDD said, that the employer was acting on his own, and certainly not based on any EDD requirement to not hire a person if he or she did not have a SSN. I followed up my phone call with Mr. Sunseri by sending him a letter (see Exhibit G) by certified mail on December 21, 2001, asking him to put that in writing.

4. On February 14, 2002, I received a favorable letter (see Exhibit H) from Marty Kashevaroff, Chief, Audit Section, which was dated January 11, 2002. Mr. Kashevaroff was now the fourth person within the EDD that validated my claims in support of the laws 26 USC Sec. 6724 and Treasury Regulation 301.6109-1(c) or 26 CFR 301.6109-1(c). Marty Kashevaroff wrote that the:

5. This response by the EDD, therefore, proves that SVSC was not being truthful when saying that obtaining a SSN from all employees was an absolute requirement of EDD regulations. Regardless, SVSC cannot claim that EDD requirements prevent them from making a "reasonable accommodation" for my religious beliefs under Title VII.

1. After I contacted the EDD, but before I received confirmation from them in writing, I wrote to Ron Welton the second time in a letter (see Exhibit D) sent by certified mail, to tell him of the positive results of my telephone contact with the EDD. In that letter, I told Mr. Welton that Mr. Sunseri from the EDD adamantly and repeatedly told me that if an employer denied employment to someone who did not have a SSN, that employer would not be said to be acting on the basis of EDD requirements, but that such an employer would be acting on their own authority. I also mentioned that I was requesting written confirmation of these facts from the EDD. I was very confident that SVSC would quickly realize the truth of what the laws are, and that they would hire me.

2. Ron Welton again promptly called me after receiving my second letter (See Exhibit D) sent by certified mail to him. On the phone, Ron Welton said his bottom line was that he would not hire me unless I had a SSN. He said that the bottom line was that if I needed to contact whomever I was going to contact to initiate any legal proceedings, I should do just that because "he knows he's right." Mr. Welton read something from "Pub 15 in circular E" to me, saying something to the effect that employers are required to furnish SSNs to the IRS. He said he also spoke to the IRS. He said it was totally clear.

3. I asked him if what I sent was not clear; the law that stated that the employer is merely required to ask for the number, and if the employer doesn't get it, the employer simply has to state that, and then there would be no penalty, is there anything not clear about "no penalty?" Ron Welton paused a bit, and he said he understood that there would be no penalty if he could show "cause," and that he understood from the IRS who told him that there was an exemption for the Amish, so he asked me, "Are you Amish?"

4. At that point, I was extremely upset. I believe I said something to the effect of, "So you know there's a religious exemption, but you refuse to apply it to me?" (I didn't mention that that is the very essence of religious discrimination.) I believe he responded with something to the effect of, "I don't know what your deal is, but if there is an exemption for you, that's between you and the IRS."

5. It seemed as if he would not accept any "cause" except "being Amish". I found that response to be completely outrageous and highly offensive because it is such an absurd excuse to discriminate against me.

6. Furthermore, Mr. Welton's statement that my tax issues are between me and the IRS is exactly what I was trying to convince Mr. Welton of earlier, that I'm responsible for paying any tax liability on my own since there will be no withholdings.

7. Finally, Mr. Welton also said that he was also required to give the SSN not only to the IRS, but also to the Social Security Administration, and to the State of California, as if there were more requirements that I didn't know about. So I said "well, then I guess I should contact the EEOC, because obviously we are not getting anywhere." And the conversation ended.

8. Again, this proves that Ron Welton, as an employee of SVSC, did knowingly and willfully discriminate against be based purely on my religious beliefs. He knew there was an exemption in law for the SSN requirement. He knew he could apply the exemption for the requirements for a SSN if he could show "cause". His use of the word "cause", in relation to acknowledging that showing "cause" would provide an exemption, indicates that he was familiar with the laws that say, "…if it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect," as the law says in 26 USC Sec. 6724, and similarly in Treasury Regulation 301.6109-1(c).

9. However, Ron Welton's reasoning indicated that he did not consider my religious beliefs to have any validity, in contrast to the religious beliefs of the Amish, and therefore, unlike the Amish, my beliefs could not be used as "cause." He asked me if I was Amish, as if only the Amish have a valid religious belief to not use the SSN. That's blatantly illegal discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, and indicates that he purposefully and willfully discriminated against me personally based on my religious affiliation or lack thereof because I'm not Amish.

1. Since Ron Welton was unable to resolve my employment dispute, I wrote and sent a third letter (see Exhibit E) by certified mail to SVSC, return receipt requested, on January 7th. In this letter, I went over what had happened and my conversations with Jim Brady and Ron Welton, explaining again the laws and asking for Hans Burkhart to use his authority as SVSC's General Manager to instruct Ron Welton to hire me and follow the procedure in the laws which say to file an affidavit showing cause and not willful neglect when an employer is unable to obtain a SSN from an employee. Hans Burkhart replied by letter (see Exhibit I) to my letter by certified mail, indicating that he read my letter, and thus proving that he was informed of the laws, and Hans Burkhart clearly chose the path of willful neglect.

1. On February 14, 2002, I received the written response from the EDD (see Exhibit H) to my letter (see Exhibit G) to them. I took several copies of the EDD's response with me to Ron Welton's office, where I met him in person for the first time. He read the letter, and his response was basically, "So what?" and he rehashed a few invalid arguments that he already made to me, and that SVSC would not hire me.

2. According to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, punitive damages may be awarded if complainant shows the employer acted with "reckless disregard" for the law. This is shown in the CRA 1991 code under the subheading: DAMAGES IN CASES OF INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION, SEC. 102 "(b) Compensatory and Punitive Damages. -

"(1) Determination of punitive damages. - A complaining party

may recover punitive damages under this section against a respondent

(other than a government, government agency or political subdivision) if

the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a

discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with

reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved

individual.

1. So, left with no choice, after I had fully informed SVSC of the key points in law that relates to the issue at hand, I filed a civil complaint (see Exhibit J) with the EEOC against SVSC, and I filed a criminal complaint against Ron Welton personally (see Exhibit K) with the U.S. Justice Department. I mailed both the criminal and the civil complaints at the same time, on February 25, 2002.

2. The EEOC issued to me a "right to sue" letter (see Exhibit A) dated April 15, 2002, saying I have to file this complaint in Federal Court within 90 days.

3. The U.S. Justice Department responded (see Exhibit L) on May 30, 2002, saying my criminal complaint "has been forwarded to the Employment Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division for review and response," which I am still waiting on. They additionally urged me to contact my local United States Attorney's Office, and they were even so kind as to tell me which office is nearest to me, and inform them of my criminal complaint. I intend to follow up on my criminal complaint as soon as possible.

1. When the EEOC in San Francisco reviewed my complaint, they responded by saying they would not file suit themselves. With that decision, they included information about how the United States Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit recently ruled against a Title VII employment claim by a person without a SSN in Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Medical Center, case No. 99-55050, on 9-16-99. The EEOC copied to me what appears to be an article about the ruling (see Exhibit M). I was able to obtain a copy of the actual ruling from my local law library under the heading 192 F.3d 826, and this copy is also attached (see Exhibit N). This ruling is obviously in error.

2. The Judges state, as a reason for the ruling, that the "employer is not liable under Title VII when accommodating and employee's religious beliefs would require the employer to violate federal or state law." That statement, in principle, is clearly correct, but it does not apply to people without SSNs because it is not an absolute requirement of law for an employer to obtain or report a SSN for all employees.

3. Obviously, I was concerned with the apparent EDD requirements, but my research, and the EDD response to me, and the laws repeatedly referenced above, make it abundantly clear that accommodating my religious belief would NOT require SVSC to violate any laws, since the law provides clear instruction for what to do when an employer is unable to obtain a SSN from an employee.

4. Although the article and the ruling state that there are government requirements for employers to either: A.) obtain and B.) provide SSNs of all employees to the appropriate government agencies, neither the article nor the ruling state what those laws actually are, and neither the article nor the ruling seems to acknowledge the laws I have presented in this complaint that the EDD is obviously aware of, laws that clearly prove that there is NOT an absolute requirement to obtain a SSN from employees, but only that an employer must ask for a SSN, (note: that is ask, and not obtain), and report to the government what the results were after asking: by either reporting a SSN, or by providing an affidavit showing that such failure to obtain a SSN after asking for a SSN is "due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect."

1. I believe this case is among the most important cases ever heard by any court in the United States since the founding of our great nation. The result of the ruling of this case cuts to the heart of the freedoms Americans cherish the most. We all have a right to live. We have a right to work. We have the right to earn money so that we can eat and live. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to free speech and freedom of religion. We have a right to engage in contracts unfettered by compulsion or force. The fact is that there is no law that forces employers to OBTAIN a SSN from their employees, employers are only required to ASK and report. If there were such a law mandating participation in the Social Security program, it would be totally unconstitutional on many grounds. But since no such law exists, there is no reason for me to challenge any such fictional law. Instead, I can only sue my former employer. If there were such a law, it would be tantamount to the United States engaging in a war against people without SSNs by erecting economic sanctions against those people. Economic sanctions are nothing less than the use of force. This case clearly also affects all Americans who live and work in the United States and use SSNs. For if Americans have been compelled to enter into the Social Security program through fraud or deceit or force, then the employment contracts that they have signed are all null and void, for no contract is valid if it is entered into under a state of duress. If the government points a gun to my head and says "sign this contract or else", such a contract is clearly not a valid one, and such a thing is certainly not compatible with the concept of freedom. Likewise, if a person cannot get a job without participation in the contracts of Social Security such as signing the voluntary W-4, then such a process is nothing less than an economic sanction and an attempt at force and compulsion. This is the reason why the laws are written the way they are, so that they maintain their validity, and this is the reason why the W-4 laws say that these are voluntary agreements. It is self evident that a voluntary agreement cannot be a mandatory condition of employment.

1. Therefore, I pray the court for a speedy Jury Trial. I plead for the maximum punitive damages as prescribed by law under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title I, Sec 102, (D) "in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $300,000."

2. I plead for a judgment to compensate me for reasonable attorney's fee, legal expenses, copies, and mailings, as may be prescribed by law under Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS, SEC. 2000e-5. [Section 706] (k):

In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its

discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or

the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees)

as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall

be liable for costs the same as a private person.

3. I plead for back pay as is described under Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS, SEC. 2000e-5. [Section 706] (g) (1):

If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally

engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice

charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from

engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative

action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,

reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by

the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may

be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other

equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall

not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge

with the Commission. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable

diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to

reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.

Therefore, I plead for back pay for days when I would have been working for SVSC as a ski coach if they had obeyed the laws, as they should have. I estimate this amount to be based on working 3 days a week, working 8-hour days, at $8.50/hour from December 17 to April 30 for a total of 19.5 weeks, for a total of $3,978.00. I also plead under SEC. 2000e-5. [Section 706] (g) (1):, quoted above, for injunctive relief that will allow me to work for SVSC in the future as a ski coach, and without having to provide a SSN.

4. I plead for an unspecified amount, to be determined later, to compensate me for the time required, inconvenience, and emotional distress of having to take this matter before the court.

_____________________

Jason Hommel, Plaintiff

Table of Contents:

p. 1, JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

p. 2, JURISDICTION

p. 2, SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

p. 3, SUMMARY OF EVENTS LEADING TO COMPLAINT

p. 5, DISPUTES OVER LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS

p. 7, MY RESPONSE TO SVSC'S ARGUMENTS; CITING THE LAWS

p. 8, SVSC'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAWS SHOWS

SVSC'S WILLFUL AND RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE LAWS

p. 9, RON WELTON FALSELY CLAIMS AN EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT (EDD) MANDATORY LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO OBTAIN AND PROVIDE A SSN FOR ALL EMPLOYEES

p. 11, THE DISCRIMINATION IS SPECIFICALLY

BASED ON MY RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

p. 13, MY FINAL APPEAL TO SVSC GENERAL MANAGER, HANS BURKHART

p. 13, MORE RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE LAW SHOWN

p. 14, FILING CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CHARGES

p. 14, ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FROM THE EEOC RESPONSE

AND A NINTH CIRCUIT COURT RULING

p. 15, FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

p. 17, CONCLUSION & REMEDIES SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFF

p. 19, INDEXED TABLE OF CONTENTS

p. 20, INDEXED TABLE OF STATUTES, RULES, ORDINANCES, CASES, AND OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED CITED

p. 22, TABLE OF EXHIBITS

INDEXED TABLE OF STATUTES, RULES, ORDINANCES, CASES, AND OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED.

(in order mentioned in document)

p. 1: Civil Rights Act of 1991 Title I, Sec 102, (C), (1)

(c) Jury Trial. - If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this section - "(1) any party may demand a trial by jury.

p. 2, 14: "Right to Sue" letter by the EEOC, (Exhibit A)

p 2, 3, 5, 7, 12 : Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

p 2, 6, 13: The Civil Rights Act of 1991,

p 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 12, 15: 26 USC Sec. 6724 "No penalty shall be imposed under this part with respect to any failure if it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect."

p 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 12, 15 : Treasury Regulation 301.6109-1(c) or 26 CFR 301.6109-1(c).When the person filing the return statement, or other document does not know the SSN of the other person, and has complied with the request provision of this paragraph, he shall sign an affidavit on the transmittal document forwarding such returns, statements, or other documents to the Internal Revenue Service so stating. A payor is required to request the identifying number of the payee. If after such request has been made, the payee does not furnish the payor with an identifying number, the penalty ($50.00) will not be assessed against the payor, if it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect."

p 2: Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS, SEC. 2000e-5. [Section 706], (3) "Each United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter."

p 9, 10, 11, 13: California Employment Development Department, (EDD).

p 13: Civil Rights Act of 1991: DAMAGES IN CASES OF INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION, SEC. 102 "(b) Compensatory and Punitive Damages. - "(1) Determination of punitive damages. - A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section against a respondent (other than a government, government agency or political subdivision) if the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.

p 11: "Pub 15 in circular E"--Quoted by Ron Welton to me over the phone.

p 14: U.S. Justice Dept. response to my criminal complaint. (Exhibit L)

p 14: United States Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit, Case No. 99-55050, on 9-19-99, 192 F.3d 826

p 16: First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States

p 17: Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title I, Sec 102, (D) "in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $300,000."

p 17: Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS, SEC. 2000e-5. [Section 706] (k): In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.

p 17, 18: Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS, SEC. 2000e-5. [Section 706] (g) (1): If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.

Table of Exhibits & Dates

Exhibit A "Right to Sue" letter from the EEOC, April 15, 2002

Exhibit B Daily Journal by JH, December 16th, 2001

Exhibit C first letter to SVSC from JH, December 18, 2001

Exhibit D second letter to SVSC from JH, December 31, 2001

Exhibit E third letter to SVSC from JH, January 7, 2002

Exhibit F letter to JH from Ron Welton, December 22, 2001

Exhibit G letter to EDD from JH, December 21, 2001

Exhibit H letter to JH from EDD, Dated January 11, 2002, received February 14th, 2002

Exhibit I letter to JH from Hans Burkhart, January 9, 2002

Exhibit J civil complaint filed with EEOC, February 25, 2002

Exhibit K criminal complaint filed with Justice Dept., February 25, 2002

Exhibit L reply from Justice Dept to criminal complaint, May 30, 2002

Exhibit M EEOC article about the Court of Appeals ruling on the SSN/employment issue, 9/16/99

Exhibit N copy of the Court of Appeals ruling on the SSN/employment issue, 9/16/99